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This special issue is the outgrowthof a 2007 conference,Entrepreneurship:
Strategy and Structure, sponsored by the NBER Working Groups on
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy and the Economy. The aim of
the conference and special issue are to provide a forum for rigorous
frontier research on the microeconomic and institutional foundations
of entrepreneurship, and the strategic and market consequences of
entrepreneurial activity. Thepapers included in the Special Issue include
a subset of papers presented at the conference as well as papers
submitted as the result of a solicitation for the Special Issue from the
journal. As with all special issues in JEMS, all of the articles in this issue
have gone through the standard editing and refereeing process that is
applied to all submissions to JEMS. We would especially like to thank
Dan Spulber, Josh Lerner, and Bob Strom for their help throughout the
process, and the Kauffman Foundation for providing support for the
original NBER conference.
Although traditional research in economics has mostly ignored
entrepreneurship, or otherwise equated it with amechanism for finding
market equilibrium, economists havemade considerable progressmore
recently in understanding the economic foundations and consequences
of entrepreneurial activity. Applying frontier theoretical and empirical
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tools of modern economics, this emerging literature focuses on en-
trepreneurship as an economic process of self-interested strategic agents
interacting in environments marked by a high level of uncertainty
and incomplete information. Rather than taking entrepreneurship to
be exogenous, the decision to become an entrepreneur is grounded
in the underlying microeconomic environment, and both the structure
and performance of entrepreneurial firms depend on the strategic and
institutional setting. Systematic research along these lines impinges
on related research in numerous fields, including the economics of
innovation, industrial organization, finance, labor economics, urban
economics, organizational economics, and even economic sociology.
Although this range highlights the diversity of phenomena that come
together in the study of entrepreneurial companies, the research shares
the common objective of providing a deeper understanding of the
drivers of entrepreneurial strategy and the causes and consequences
of the structure of entrepreneurial activity. Looking over the collection
of papers included in this Special Issue, we would argue that the “new
economics of entrepreneurship” is no longer in its infancy, but is now
an active and rapidly growing field.
We loosely organize the papers in the Special Issue into four broad
themes:
• The impact of the local environment and requirements for en-
trepreneurship
• Strategic interaction between entrepreneurs and more established
firms
• The structure of entrepreneurial finance
• The structure of entrepreneurial organizations.
In introducing the individual papers, we emphasize these themes and
note some crosscutting insights from the studies.
The first set of papers focuses on the impact of the local en-
vironment and requirements for entrepreneurship. Glaeser and Kerr
(2009) focus on the local determinants of entrepreneurship within
manufacturing. Although industry-specific or region-specific studies
have emphasized particular factors in isolation, Glaser and Kerr (2009)
draw on detailed data from the U.S. Census’ Longitudinal Business
Database to distinguish between the relative salience of multiple poten-
tial drivers of entrepreneurship across a wide range of industries and
locations. Though their findings are limited to themanufacturing sector,
they highlight the role of a large number of small suppliers and the
presence of industries using similar types of labor as important drivers
of entrepreneurial investment. Whereas small upstream suppliers and
knowledge flows seem to be particularly important for smaller entrants,
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larger entrants are sensitive to a wider range of drivers, including more
general input conditions. More generally, these results highlight the sig-
nificant role of local conditions in entrepreneurship and the importance
of favorable input conditions for entrepreneurship requiring significant
upfront investments.
Giannetti and Simonov (2009) offer a complementary perspective
by evaluating the impact of selection into entrepreneurship arising
from social interactions and relationships with other entrepreneurs.
Although prior research has established that entrepreneurship by a
given individual ismore likely in an environmentwith a higher number
of entrepreneurs, Giannetti and Simonov (2009) focus on untangling
the mechanism behind this relationship. In particular, if peer effects in
entrepreneurship are the result of higher marginal productivity, then
communities characterized by a high rate of entrepreneurship should
also be associated with higher monetary returns to entrepreneurship;
conversely, if peer effects result from nonpecuniary benefits, social
communities associated with a high level of entrepreneurship should
be associated with low relative returns to entrepreneurship. Using
an extremely detailed survey of Swedish households that includes
information about the decision to become an entrepreneur as well as
income, and exploiting an identification approach that allows them
to overcome the “reflection” problem, Giannetti and Simonov (2009)
offer persuasive evidence that the returns to entrepreneurship are
lower in those neighborhoods and social groups with higher rates
of entrepreneurship. These findings suggest that the propensity and
consequences for entrepreneurship must account for the fact that
entrepreneurship may involve significant nonpecuniary benefits, and
that these benefits may be grounded in the local microeconomic and
social environment.
Baumol et al. (2009) evaluate how the conditions and requirements
for breakthrough entrepreneurship and innovation have changed over
time. Specifically, motivated by the casual observation that many
prominent entrepreneurs received little formal education, Baumol et al.
(2009) evaluate the formal educational attainment of breakthrough
entrepreneurs and innovators. Combining a number of different sources
to establish a dataset of famous inventors and entrepreneurs over time,
Baumol et al. (2009) find that both entrepreneurship and innovation
tend to be associatedwith ahigh level of educational attainment, and the
level of educational attainment for both groups is increasing over time.
Perhaps most intriguingly, the educational attainment of prominent
inventors is significantly higher than the educational attainment of
prominent entrepreneurs. The analysis of Baumol et al. (2009) make
an important contribution to an emerging body of evidence that the
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human capital required to innovate at the frontier is increasing over
time. It also raises the possibility that this “burden of knowledge” is
more salient for technical inventors thanmarket-focused entrepreneurs.
More generally, the analysis raises the important (if difficult to answer)
question: while most formal education has only a limited application to
entrepreneurship, what type of educational system could best support
an entrepreneurial economy?
The second group of papers in the volume considers the nature
of strategic interaction between start-up innovators and more estab-
lished firms. Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009) consider the impact of
patent thickets in the software industry on the ability of technology
entrepreneurs to attract venture and IPO financing. With the rise of
patenting in the software industry, a contentious policy debate has
arisen over the ability of established firms to use the patent system
to raise entry barriers and the transaction costs of entering software
markets. Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009) develop a novel dataset that
allows them to track the entry andfinancingof entrepreneurial ventures,
as well as exit, across a range of software markets. They are able to
exploit the fact that software markets vary in terms of the size and
complexity of the underlying patent thicket and that software markets
experienced a shift in the level of protection afforded by software
patents. Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009) find significant evidence that
patent thickets are indeed associated with a decline in the financing of
entrepreneurial ventures. This effect is concentrated among those firms
that do not have intellectual property themselves. Their papermakes an
important contribution to an emerging body of research,which suggests
that the nature of strategic interaction between start-up and established
firms in the product market has an important effect on the level and
timing of entrepreneurial investment.
In a related vein, Simcoe et al. (2009) examine whether standard-
setting organizations play different roles for entrepreneurial versus
established firms. Specifically, in the information and communications
industries, formal standard-setting organizations play a key role in
coordinating the development of technology platforms. An important
part of this process is the disclosure of patents to the standard-setting or-
ganization that impingeonproposed standards. Simcoe et al. (2009) doc-
ument a striking pattern: patent disclosures by smaller (entrepreneurial)
firms are associated with a much higher rate of patent litigation, while
patent disclosures by established firms have no discernible impact
on the propensity for litigation. These findings suggest that although
larger firms may cooperate on standards and compete on the basis
of implementation, smaller firms may be more aggressive enforcing
intellectual property rights, as part of their strategy of generating
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returns from innovation through licensing. More generally, both of
these papers highlight the central role of strategic interaction between
established firms and entrepreneurs in shaping the incentives for start-
up innovation and the consequences of entrepreneurial investment.
The issues of strategy and structure in entrepreneurial companies
are also highly relevant when it comes to finance. A growing body
of evidence suggests that the choice of investor is closely linked
to the technology and product market strategies of entrepreneurial
companies. Venture capitalists, for example, are professional investors
who can identify promising innovative companies andprovidevaluable
advice andmentoring.Gompers et al. (2009) provide a freshperspective,
applying the tools of economics to the strategy of venture capital firms
themselves. Gompers et al. (2009) ask which venture capital firms per-
form best, as a function of their investment strategies. An important di-
mension of the investment strategy is the degree of specialization. Being
specialized exposes investors to significant industry risk, but helps them
to gain deeper industry experience. The analysis ofGompers et al. (2009)
shows that specialist outperform generalist, and that generalist teams
are better off when they have partners that are individually specialized,
even if the partnership as a whole covers a diversity of industries.
This paper makes two important contributions. First, venture capital
firms can themselves be analyzed as entrepreneurial organizations that
make strategic decisions affecting their ability to create and capture
value. Second, the paper refines our understanding of the relationships
between entrepreneurial companies and their investors, making the
important point that the value of venture capital investors depends
on their level of industry expertise, and in particular the degree of
specialization in the companies’ industry.
The paper by Strausz (2009) further examines how investor knowl-
edge affects the financing and structure of entrepreneurial companies.
Strausz’s (2009) theoretical model is based on the assumption that
investors, including venture capitalists, can have information that is
not available to the entrepreneur, such as information about the viability
or marketability of an entrepreneurial idea. The main dilemma in this
paper is that the investor’s superior information can have not only a
positive but also a negative effect. Specifically, favorable information
spurns the entrepreneur to provide effort, but unfavorable informa-
tion discourages the entrepreneur and worsens an underlying agency
problem (modeled as an under-provision of private effort). The paper
shows that the negative effect of information sometimes outweighs the
positive, and that under certain circumstances the optimal information
structure would involve partial information disclosure. Interestingly,
thepaperdemonstrates that suchpartial informationdisclosure requires
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centralization, so that one investor shouldprovide both information and
financing jointly. As a consequence, the paper provides a theoretical
perspective on the structure of venture capital financing itself, and the
underlying economic reasons why venture capitalist combine financing
with the provision of value-adding advice.
The notion that more information does not always lead to better
outcomes also pervades the final two papers in this special issue.
These last two papers focus on the internal organizational structure
of entrepreneurial companies. One of the fundamental difficulties of
doing research on entrepreneurial companies is the lack of information
available to researchers. This is because entrepreneurial companies are
less transparent to outsiders than larger more established corporations.
Although most researchers accept this as a fact of life, the paper by
Almazan et al. (2009) actually asks the simple question: Why are
start-ups less transparent than established companies? Their theory
provides novel and important insights into the broader question of
when transparency is economically undesirable. Almazan et al. (2009)
consider a model where an entrepreneurial company has to make a
fundamental structural choice about the generation of interim informa-
tion concerning its prospects of success. Revealing interim information
affects thedemandsmadeby stakeholders, such as thewagesdemanded
by employees. The model recognizes the importance of heterogeneity
among stakeholders, and explains why some stakeholders are able to
extract rents from the new venture. A key insight of the model is that
if the company generates more interim information, stakeholders can
use that information to extract more rents. For example, a company that
releases unfavorable news may be forced to pay higher wages, yet a
company with favorable information may not be able to get away with
lower wages. A key insight from the analysis is that not generating any
interim information may give the entrepreneurial company the benefit
of the doubt. More generally, the paper establishes why lack of trans-
parency may be particularly valuable to entrepreneurial companies.
The benefit of limited information disclosure is also at the core
of the paper by Daughety and Reinganum (2009). They consider a
contracting problem between a buyer and a company that is composed
of a team of two complementary entrepreneurs. In a standard moral
hazard setting, there is a significant free-rider problem, where each
of the two entrepreneurs provides too little effort to improve product
quality. The main insight of the Daughety and Reinganum (2009)
model is that in the context of an entrepreneurial company, there is a
countervailing adverse selection problem. They consider the casewhere
the buyer looks for quality signals because of imperfect information
about the true quality of the product. If talent is unobservable but
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effort observable, each entrepreneurwill increase his/her effort to signal
higher quality to the buyer. The need to prove themselves increases the
efforts of both team members. As a consequence, a team of unknown
entrepreneurs may actually outperform a team of entrepreneurs whose
quality is fully known by the buyer. More generally, the model by
Daughety and Reinganum (2009) shows that the limited transparency
that is common in entrepreneurial companies can actually constitute an
economic advantage.
In summary, the papers of this special issue have distinct implica-
tions for understanding the conditions under which entrepreneurship
is likely to thrive, and how the institutional environment impacts the
structure, strategy, and performance of entrepreneurial firms. They
reflect an emerging body of theoretical and empirical papers, which
provide amuchfirmer foundation to the economics of entrepreneurship.
Outside of economics, there is a long tradition of documenting aspects
of the entrepreneurial process. We believe that a defining characteristic
of the new economics of entrepreneurship is to go beyond a descriptive
analysis. All the papers in this special issue advance our understanding
of the causes and consequences of entrepreneurial activity through
rigorous theoretical and empirical reasoning about the structure of
entrepreneurial activity.
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